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EXPLAINING AND TRUSTING EXPERT EVIDENCE: WHAT IS A 
‘SUFFICIENTLY RELIABLE SCIENTIFIC BASIS’? 
1. Introduction 
The principle governing judicial scrutiny of the reliability of expert evidence in criminal 
trials in England and Wales is ‘that in determining the issue of admissibility, the court 
must be satisfied that there is a sufficiently reliable scientific basis for the evidence to be 
admitted. If there is then the court leaves the opposing views to be tested before the jury.’1 
According to Criminal Practice Direction (CPD) 19A.4, this principle applies ‘especially’, 
but not solely, to scientific evidence and courts are ‘encouraged’ to consider similar factors 
to those which the Law Commission (2011) recommended should become statutory 
preconditions for admissibility. Possibly because of lack of awareness in the profession of 
what the CPD requires (Davies and Piasecki 2016), there is a dearth of case law on its 
interpretation. This article sets out a view of how it ought to be interpreted 
The combination of the ‘sufficient reliability’ test with a reaffirmation of the jury’s role as 
the final arbiter of the weight of evidence reflects a tension between two fundamental 
principles of the criminal jury trial: that defendants should be convicted only when their 
guilt is proved to the criminal standard on a ‘logically justifiable basis’;2 and that it is for 
the jury, not any purported expert, to determine what weight can be given to any piece of 
evidence in deciding whether the standard of proof is met. The principle of rational fact-
finding or ‘epistemic due process’ (Brewer 1998, Beecher-Monas 2009) can be invoked to 
support an ‘exclusionary ethos’ (Edmond and Roach 2011: 396-405), according to which 
only evidence that demonstrably meets rigorous standards of scientific validity (or 
analogous standards in non-scientific fields of expertise) can be admitted. On the other 
hand, the role of the jury in determining the weight of evidence according to its own lights 
can be to support the much criticised ‘laissez-faire approach’ (Law Commission, 2011: 
11), which demands little more of expert evidence than that it be relevant and capable of 
assisting the jury. The CPD cannot plausibly be interpreted as  either of these opposing 
views. Being anchored in existing case law, it cannot be supposed to embrace an 
‘exclusionary ethos’ which would radically change the previously existing approach. But 
by incorporating as many of the Law Commission’s recommendations as could be 
implemented without legislation, it clearly signals a rejection of the laissez faire approach.3 
In looking for a tenable middle ground between the exclusionary and laissez-faire 
approaches, it is important to appreciate that the jury has different tasks and a different 
epistemic standpoint to that of a scientist. hether a lay tribunal, considering the evidence 
as whole, can be sure of guilt is a different question from whether a particular piece of 
evidence, considered in isolation, conforms to some test of scientific validity. The jury 
performs two epistemic functions that cannot be appropriately performed either by expert 
witnesses themselves or by regulatory bodies that provide quality control in various fields 
of expertise. One is the task of putting all the evidence, expert and non-expert, together 
and determining whether it satisfies them to the relevant standard of proof (i.e. the criminal 
one, or in cases where the defendant has the onus of proving a defence, the civil one). The 
 
1 R v Dlugosz [2013] EWCA Crim 2, [2013] 1 Cr App R 32, [11] 
2 R v Henderson R v Henderson [2010] EWCA Crim 1269, [2010] 2 Cr App R 24, [2] 
3 See also Leveson LJ’s remarks in R v H [2014] EWCA Crim 1555, [44]. 
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other is to determine on behalf of the community at large what degree of trust can be 
placed in the experts. As the OJ Simpson case famously demonstrated, where either the 
scientists themselves, or those who the collect trace evidence they analyse, are viewed as 
untrustworthy, otherwise extremely powerful scientific evidence may fail to satisfy a jury 
(Lynch et al 2008: 113-20). 
Because these two aspects of the weight of evidence – the explanatory inferences to be 
drawn from the whole body of evidence of which it forms part, and the degree to which 
the witness can be trusted – are matters reserved for the jury, the judge cannot determine 
the weight of the evidence by examining the expert evidence in isolation. What the judge 
can determine is, to borrow a phrase from hearsay law,4 whether the evidence is potentially 
safely reliable. As the Court of Appeal has explained in the hearsay context: 
The critical word is ‘potentially’. The job of the judge is not to look for independent 
complete verification. It is to ensure that the hearsay can safely be held to be reliable. 
That means looking… at its strengths and weaknesses, at the tools available to the 
jury for testing it, and at its importance to the case as a whole.5  
(1)  The judge has to consider whether in the light of other evidence that is expected to be 
given they jury may be placed in a position where they could rely on the evidence as 
part of the basis on which they convict or acquit the defendant.Tsekiri-type cases, where 
the  
(2) Reed-type cases, where the expert infers an activity-level proposition from a source-
level one, and although the validity of the source-level evidence (that it is the 
product of a properly validated method, correctly applied) is not disputed, the 
validity of the activity-level inference (what Carr et al, 2018, call the ‘evaluative 
validity’ of scientific evidence) is questionable.    
(3) Dlugosz-type cases where the  
These three different scenarios will be considered in detail in sections 4-6 below. Before 
that, the two following sections will address, respectively, the importance of explanatory 
inferences and of trust in evaluating scientific evidence.  
Explanationism and potential reliability 
In terms of what Allen and Pardo (2019), perhaps somewhat over-dramatically, portray as 
the ‘paradigm shift’ from Bayesian to explanationist approaches to evidence law,6 the 
present account is firmly on the explanationist side of the divide. That is, it assumes that 
the way juries assess evidence is not to consider each piece of evidence sequentially to 
determine how much more or less likely it makes a particular hypothesis, but rather to 
consider what explanatory theory best accounts for the evidence as a whole. A good 
explanation is, broadly, one that is coherent, plausible (given the jury’s background 
assumptions about the likelihood of events), and accounts for all or most of the evidence. 
This, according to the explanationist paradigm, is not only good descriptive account of 
how juries decide cases (Pennington and Hastie 1993), it is also normatively appropriate 
 
4 R v Ibrahim [2012] EWCA Crim 837, [2012] 2 Cr App R 32, [107]. 
5 R v Riat [2012] EWCA Crim 1509, [2013] 1 WLR 2592 [33]. 
6 Allen and Pardo make this claim in the abstract of their (2019). The fact that they do not repeat the claim 
in the article itself suggests that it should not be taken too literally.  
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as a way of making justified knowledge-claims about past events (MacCormick 2005, Ch 
11). 
Explanationism is also consistent with what I take to be the most convincing account of 
the epistemology of testimony (in the philosophers’ sense of whatever people tell each 
other), or at any rate the one best suited to the evaluation of formal testimony in a court 
of law.7 Believing testimony, on this account, relies on a form of inference to the best 
explanation (Lipton 1998, Gelfert 2010). We believe a witness’s account if we can infer 
that the best explanation of their saying what they do is that they actually witnessed 
(something like) the events that they now claim to remember, or that they arrived at their 
scientific conclusion by the competent application of a valid scientific method. We 
disbelieve or doubt it if there another good explanation, for example that the witness is 
lying to protect a lover; or in the case of expert evidence, that the witness is mistaken, 
biased, or downright fraudulent.  
In explanationist accounts of fact-finding the standard of proof that a party has to meet is 
not a threshold of mathematical probability but rather a qualitative judgment of the 
‘relative plausibility’ of two or more explanatory theories; where the criminal standard of 
proof applies, ‘the state must demonstrate that there is no plausible account consistent with 
innocence’ (Allen 1991: 382). Denning J (as he then was) said something similar in Miller 
v Minister of Pensions: 
If the evidence is so strong against a man as to leave only a remote possibility in his 
favour which can be dismissed with the sentence ‘of course it is possible, but not in the 
least probable,’ the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt, but nothing short of that 
will suffice. 8 
Jurors may differ in their ideas of what is plausible or realistic (because they have different 
experiences and assumptions about social life) and in the degree of caution they apply in 
deciding what can be ruled out. They may therefore differ in their assessment of whether 
a body of evidence has sufficient weight to meet the standard of proof. 
The question whether a reasonable jury could, looking at the expert evidence in context, 
arrive at a position where they rule out all innocent explanations of the evidence arises in 
two contexts: decisions about the admissibility of the expert evidence, and about whether 
the defendant has a case to answer. Which test to apply may depend on whether the expert 
advances a strong claim, which may go beyond what is admissible, or a weaker claim that 
may be insufficient to raise a case to answer. For example in the recent case of Bech9 the 
experts instructed by the prosecution and defence agreed that the profile of the ‘major 
contributor’ to the DNA recovered from the airbag of a crashed car was one billion times 
more likely to be found if it came from Mr Bech than if it came from an unknown unrelated 
person; but they found it impossible to assess the relatively probabilities of several different 
 
7 In contrast to the ‘assurance view of testimony’ (Moran 2018), which is most plausible in situations that 
are remote from the ‘juridical’ one where testimony has to be evaluated as evidence (McMyler 2011: 59-60). 
8 [1947] 2 All ER 372, 373. For recent approval of this statement in a criminal law context see R v Smith 
[2012] EWCA Crim 702, [16]. Keane and McKeown (2019) draw on Miller to formulate a new definition of 
the criminal standard in terms of ‘no realistic doubts’. 
9 [2018] EWCA Crim 448. 
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explanations of how it got there.10 If the prosecution expert had expressed the opinion that 
the most probable explanation was that the DNA was there because Bech was driving at 
the time of the crash, there would have been an issue as to whether that inference was 
sufficiently reliable to be admitted (and this would have been a Reed-type case in our 
terminology). As it was, the admissibility of the agreed, cautiously worded evidence was 
uncontested; instead the question (in a Tsekiri-type case) was whether on the basis of 
‘common sense’ inferences from the circumstances of the crash, the  
One difficulty faced by the explanationist paradigm is to explain how (if it all) the criminal 
standard of proof can be satisfied in cases that largely depend on the uncorroborated 
evidence of one witness – whether an eyewitness or an expert. Given how poorly equipped 
human beings are to detect one another’s lies (Bond and DePaolo 2006, Levine 2014), 
deception appears to be a possible explanation of almost every instance of testimony, even 
if it is not usually the best one. Scientific fraud and misleading reports of results are by no 
means unknown, and a lay audience has little chance of spotting them unaided.11 But juries 
are sometimes (though some might think not often enough, particularly in rape cases) 
prepared to believe the unsupported evidence of alleged victims of or experts such as the 
forensic scientist in Tsekiri. How can they rule out the possibility of deception or scientific 
fraud? The obvious answer is that in these cases they trust the witness’s honesty, even 
though they do not have specific evidence for it (except perhaps the extremely tenuous 
‘evidence’ of a witness’s demeanour).  
 
2. Trust and potential safety 
What I mean by trust is an assumption that the trusted person or category of persons will 
behave (or has behaved) in accordance with shared social norms, including the ethical 
duties of their profession or occupation (Fukuyama 1995), . When there is little or no 
positive evidence that a person is trustworthy in these respects, trust may be a matter of 
giving them the benefit of the doubt, of accepting a certain risk of betrayal as part of the 
price of cooperative social relations. In the case of testimony it may be a matter of 
‘defaulting to truth’, presuming one’s informants to be truthful until one has evidence to 
the contrary (Levine 2014).  This can be either a passive failure to consider the possibility 
of deception, or ‘a fall back cognitive state after a failure to obtain sufficient affirmative 
evidence for deception’ (ibid: 380).  
The kind of trust that does not rely on any positive evidence of trustworthiness has been 
extensively discussed in the recent literature on the epistemology of testimony (e.g. 
Faulkner 2011, McMyler 2011, Moran 2018). Without rehearsing this debate in any detail, 
I shall simply state my preferred view which largely follows those of Adler (2002) and 
Gelfert (2010, 2014) and also draws support from Levine’s (2014) work in psychology. On 
this view, trusting people to be truthful in most situations is a justifiable practice because 
experience suggests that, on the whole, it works – it allows us to acquire a lot of mostly 
 
10 Ibid [5]. 
11 The website <retractionwatch.com> provides many sobering examples (accessed 9 Jan 2020). Two UK 
forensic science providers, Randox and Trimega, have been investigated for manipulation of data: HL Deb, 
27 November 2017, c518; Dearden (2018). 
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correct information with relatively little effort – and the best explanation for its success is 
that most people are, in fact, truthful most of the time. In the case of science, what best 
explains the overall success of the scientific enterprise that while some scientists are 
fraudulent, the great majority are not (Douven and Cuypers 2009). Thus, there is no 
inconsistency between recognising the importance of trust in testimony and regarding the 
acceptance of testimony as founded on a form of inference to the best explanation. 
To what extent is it legitimate to bring these attitudes of trust into the courtroom? Here 
there is, I submit, a crucial difference between expert witnesses and others. A degree of 
trust in testimony is part of the general background knowledge that jurors bring to their 
task. Presumably jurors will vary in how trusting they are and whom they are more 
disposed to trust, and the jury as a whole represents a kind of rough community sample of 
these attitudes. The party calling a witness is not expected in adduce evidence that they 
are truthful: indeed they are generally precluded from doing so, unless it is to rebut 
evidence called by the other side (Dennis 2017: 568-9). In the case of an expert, there is 
similarly no need to prove that they are not fraudulent, unless fraud is alleged by the other 
party: that much can be taken on trust.  More broadly, courts generally trust experts to 
comply with the duties with which they solemnly declare that they have complied,12 and 
with instructions given by the judge.13 Breach of that trust can attract severe sanctions for 
contempt of court.14 The reliability of an expert’s techniques or theories, however, is not a 
matter to be taken on trust. When the reliability of an expert’s findings is an essential part 
of the prosecution’s case, it must be something that the prosecution has to prove. It is in 
this respect, pace Schauer and Spellman (2013) that expert evidence is ‘really different’. 
Arguably an exception can be made for ‘old-established, academically-based sciences such 
as medicine, geology or metallurgy, and the established professions such as architecture, 
quantity surveying or engineering’:15 their reliability as to some central aspects of their 
respective fields might be said to form part of the typical juror’s background knowledge. 
But even in that dictum, in a judgement that is  of the laissez-faire approach, Bingham LJ 
(as he then was) specifically mentioned fingerprints and handwriting as falling outside 
these ‘core areas’.16 The need to prove the reliability of handwriting evidence is confirmed 
by R v Ewing,17 where it was held that where the prosecution relies upon a comparison 
between a certain document and the defendant’s handwriting, the authenticity of the 
sample of the defendant’s handwriting with which the comparison is made (which by 
statute has to be determined by the judge) must be proved to the criminal standard. It 
would be nonsensical to apply this standard to the authenticity of the handwriting but not 
the reliability of the comparison of the handwriting with a questioned document. 
 
12 Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Zafar [2019] EWCA Civ 392, [2019] 1 WLR 3833 (sub nom Liverpool 
Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Khan), [23], [61], [65]. 
13 R v Pabon [2018] EWCA Crim 420. 
14 Liverpool Victoria Insurance Co Ltd v Zafar [2019] EWCA Civ 392 
15 R v Robb [1991] 93 Cr App R 161, 164, Bingham LJ.  
16 Ibid. 
17 (1983) 77 Cr App R 47. 
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Notoriously, this requirement has not been very strictly applied to handwriting expertise 
in English or US courts (Risinger and Saks 1996).18  
Carr et al (2016) have proposed ‘critical trust’, a concept taken from the work of Walls et 
al (2004) on perceptions of health and safety regulation and applied to forensic science by 
the former Government Chief Scientific Adviser, Sir Mark Walport (2015), as a 
‘reformative principle’ in the law of expert evidence.  My interpretation of this (somewhat 
vague) principle is that it accepts a degree of trust in the integrity and competence of 
accredited experts as essential to the generally successful social practice of relying on 
scientific and other expertise, but insists that deference to science as reliable knowledge 
can be justified only by careful scrutiny of its claims. Importantly, Carr et al (2016: 367) 
point out that only a limited amount of this scrutiny takes place through the examination 
of witnesses in court. A lot of the work has to be done by regulatory bodies such as the 
Forensic Science Regulator, and their work in turn, must be subject to scrutiny, for example 
by parliamentary committees and academics. The object of ‘critical trust’, therefore, is 
neither the individual expert nor a vast abstraction called ‘Science’, but a complex system 
of interlocking forms of regulation and scrutiny. It is not suggested that these systems need 
to be explained in detail to the jury. Rather, evidence may be ‘sufficiently reliable to be 
admitted’ if a jury which implicitly trusted that some kind of scrutiny was in place to ensure 
reliability would not be mistaken in that belief.  
Having outlined the epistemic significance of explanatory inferences and trust, and the 
relationship between them, we now turn to consider how they can be applied to the three 
types of cases distinguished in the Introduction.  
3. Tsekiri-type cases: uncorroborated expert evidence 
The first type of case is one where the source-level scientific evidence is the sole evidence 
adduced to prove (or cast doubt on) one element of the prosecution case such as the 
identity of the offender, the nature of a substance19 or the speed of a vehicle.20 The evidence 
is most likely to be controversial in relation to identification, where the prosecution argues 
that when the scientific evidence is put together with the evidence of how, where and when 
the offence was committed, the only reasonable explanation for the source-level 
proposition supported by the scientific evidence is that the defendant committed the 
offence. As indicated in the above discussion of Bech,21 the issue usually arises in the 
context of a submission of no case to answer, rather than whether the evidence is 
sufficiently reliable to be admitted. In the case of prosecution evidence, the questions of 
whether it is ‘potentially safely reliable’ (for the purpose for which the prosecution seeks 
to rely on it) and whether it forms part of a case to answer, are very similar. 
 
18 In R v Clemo [2014] EWCA Crim 1525, faced with a stark conflict of evidence between handwriting 
experts, the Court of Appeal found the conviction unsafe but gave no consideration at all to whether either 
expert’s evidence was sufficiently reliable to be admitted.  
19 E.g. R (Wright) v CPS [2015] EWHC 728 (Admin), where extremely poor-quality expert evidence of drug 
possession was ruled insufficiently reliable to be admitted. 
20 Expert evidence is not normally required where a speed measuring device is used, but is essential where 
the reliability of the device is challenged: R (DPP) v Manchester and Salford Magistrates’ Court [2017] EWHC 
3719 (Admin), [2019] 1 WLR 2617.  
21 See text to n 9 above. 
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To meet the case to answer threshold, it must be possible for a reasonable jury to rule out 
all realistic possibilities consistent with innocence.22 This entails that the prosecution must 
make the jury sure that the method used to identify the defendant was valid, highly 
accurate and correctly applied. The only forensic identification methods likely reach that 
standard are the more straightforward applications DNA analysis and fingerprinting 
(PCAST 2017). In Hookway23 and Weighman,24 however, so-called ‘facial mapping’ 
evidence (identifying similarities between the defendant’s face and an image from a 
security camera) has been treated as sufficient to establish identity, and these cases have 
been treated as important precedents in the case law on DNA evidence. Yet it is quite plain 
that facial mapping of the type used in these cases was not a technique that had been 
validated and even if it is valid, it was incapable in isolation of establishing identity to a 
level of probability that came anywhere near the criminal standard of proof (Edmond et al 
2010).  
As Redmayne (2002) argued in a commentary on Hookway, the only reasonable 
explanation for the decision is that the jury must have assumed the police had intelligence 
pointing to Hookway as a possible offender, otherwise his photograph would not have 
been submitted to the expert. In other words, they must have treated the case as if it were 
a Dlugosz-type case in which the scientific evidence could be inaccurate, but if so it would 
be remarkable coincidence that it identified a person who was incriminated by other 
evidence. But no such evidence was before the court. Therefore Hookway, and the later 
case of Weighman, contravene the elementary principle that the evidence adduced in court 
must prove to the criminal standard that the defendant is guilty. In these cases it is all to 
clear that the Court of Appeal’s respect for the jury’s role as arbiter of weight has trumped 
the competing principle that convictions must have a rational basis.  
R v Tsekiri25 itself concerned a robbery from a car, in the course of which the robber had 
placed his hand on the door-handle. Tsekiri, who lived in a nearby district of London, 
matched the ‘major contributor’ to a DNA profile obtained from the door handle. The 
Forensic Science Regulator’s (2018) Guidance on DNA mixture interpretation expresses 
caution about identifying ‘major’ and ‘minor’ contributors to mixed profiles, but accepts 
that it ‘may be supportable for a mixture where there is a clear unambiguous single strong 
profile at every locus, assigned without reference to the profile of the POI [person of 
interest]’ (para 2.9.11). The judgment says very little about how the mixed sample was 
analysed to determine which DNA alleles belonged to the major contributor, or how the 
jury could be sure that this process was free from error. As Karen Richmond points out in 
a valuable note on the case, the ‘deconvolution’ of mixed samples can involve a 
combination of professional expertise and complex computer algorithms. Any software 
that was used should have been validated as appropriate for particular types of DNA 
mixture (Royal Society and Royal Society of Edinburgh 2017a: 34-5) but the Tsekiri 
judgement tells us nothing about this. The random match probability of 1:1 billion (the 
level at which reported match probabilities are ‘capped’ in the UK) tells us nothing about 
the probability that the defendant matched a profile in which one or more loci in fact came 
 
22 R v G and F [2012] EWCA Crim 1756 [36]. 
23 [1999] Crim LR 750. 
24 [2011] EWCA Crim 2826. 
25 [2017] EWCA Crim 40, [2017] 1 WLR 2879 
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from the unknown minor contributor(s). There is no mention in Tsekiri of whether any 
expert examined the sample on behalf of the defence.  
The most problematic aspect of Tsekiri, however, is the inference from the source-level 
finding to the activity-level proposition that the defendant was in contact with the door 
handle. The scientist acknowledged that ‘the deposit of the major contributor could have 
been … due to secondary transfer though she considered secondary transfer was unlikely 
given that the DNA in question was the major contributor to the profile.’26 On the face it, 
this falls short of entitling the jury to be sure that secondary transfer was not the 
explanation of the profile. As Richmond (2017: 277) points out, research indicates that it 
is quite possible for someone to become the major contributor to DNA on an object 
through secondary transfer – for example if the robber had shaken hands with Tsekiri 
shortly before the incident (see Murphy 2015, Ch 3; Cale et al 2016). Since there was no 
dispute that the robber did touch the door handle,27 the Court was entitled to conclude 
that the best explanation of the DNA deposit was that it was Tsekiri’s DNA and Tsekiri 
was the offender. That would suffice to establish liability to the civil standard, but it is not 
so clear that all innocent explanations of the evidence could be ruled out.  
It is significant that Tsekiri turned on whether the trial judge was right to rule that there 
was a case to answer, rather than on whether the eventual verdict was safe. Where a 
defendant makes no comment in interview and does not advance a positive case at trial, 
but simply puts the prosecution to proof, no adverse inference can be drawn under the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, s 34, because the defendant has not relied on 
any fact in his defence.28 Once the judge has ruled that there is a case to answer, the 
defendant faces a dilemma. If, as Tsekiri did, he elects not to give evidence, the jury can 
draw an adverse inference under s 35 of the same Act.29 If he does give evidence after 
giving a ‘no comment’ interview, he will find it hard to avoid relying on some ‘fact’ which 
he did not mention to the police,30 thereby triggering an adverse inference under s 34.  
Since the Court of Appeal was satisfied that the s 35 inference together with the DNA 
evidence rendered the conviction safe, the Court was understandably reluctant to declare 
it unsafe on the ground that without the s 35 inference there was no case to answer. 
Even if Tsekiri’s silence could not form the basis of an adverse inference at this stage, could 
it be said that in the absence of a specific alternative explanation of the DNA on the door-
handle, the prosecution theory was only explanation the jury need consider? The Court 
reasoned: 
If a defendant in interview gives an apparently plausible account of the presence of 
his DNA profile, that might indicate that the prosecution had not raised a case to 
answer. … [But] the absence of explanation in such a case would mean that there 
would be no material to undermine the conclusion to be drawn from the DNA 
evidence.31  
 
26 Ibid, [3]. 
27 Ibid, [16]. 
28 Webber [2004] UKHL 1; [2004] 1 WLR 40 
29 Tsekiri [2017] EWCA Crim 40, [23] 
30 On the meaning of ‘fact’ in this context see R v Lewis [2018] EWCA Crim 1101. 
31 Tsekiri [15] 
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In effect, the Court is suggesting that trust in the scientist’s conclusion is the default 
position, which the jury is entitled to adopt in the absence of evidence to the contrary. But 
this is to shift the burden onto the defence in a dangerous way (Edmond 2013). The fact 
that a suspect does not suggest a specific explanation – which would take considerable 
presence of mind unless the suspect was forensically aware32 – cannot make it safe to 
disregard the possibility of an unknown means of secondary transfer. In any case, the 
expert was able to go no further than to say that secondary transfer was possible, but 
unlikely. The fact that an expert witness cannot rule out an innocent explanation as a 
matter of scientific certainty does not preclude the finding of a case to answer where there 
is other evidence on which the jury can rely.33 In the absence of such evidence, the scientific 
evidence on transfer must be both unequivocal and clearly valid. In the present state of 
knowledge that is a formidable hurdle in a case like Tsekiri, or the more recent case of 
Bech,34 where the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that ‘common sense’ sufficed to rule out 
possibilities which the scientists were unable to evaluate is, to put it charitably, a 
questionable one (Richmond 2019).  
The conclusion to which this analysis drives us, that the submission of ‘no case to answer’ 
ought to have succeeded in both Tsekiri and Bech, is not an attractive one. There surely was 
a ‘case to answer’ in the sense of a set of facts that called for an explanation from the 
accused,35 even if (in Tsekiri) it was only ‘I can’t understand it – as far as I know I’ve never 
seen the car in question, let alone touched the door-handle’. The problem is that the 
Galbraith test,36 which predates the modern law on inferences from silence, precludes an 
evaluation of the expert evidence in its full context, including the adverse inferences that 
they jury might be entitled to draw. Although the issue is beyond the scope of this article, 
there is surely a case for saying that a ‘case to answer’ should not be one on which a jury 
could convict without more, but a case on which the defendant could be convicted if they 
failed to answer it, or answered it in a way that exposed them to adverse inferences. 
Whilst I submit that Tsekiri was wrongly decided on its facts, or else decided on the wrong 
ground, this is not to dispute that DNA found on the person of a victim or on an object at 
the crime scene can in some cases be sufficient to raise a case to answer. For example in 
FNC,37 where the DNA came from semen left on the victim’s trousers, the court was in a 
much better position to be sure of the source of the DNA, because it was reasonable to 
conclude (if contamination could be excluded) that the only plausible explanation was 
provided by the victim’s account of a sexual assault.  
In such a case what the jury needs is an explanation of the science of DNA, the chain of 
custody of the sample and the procedures followed in the laboratory, sufficient to persuade 
them (if they trust the scientist not to mislead them) that the possibilities of error, 
contamination or a random match are sufficiently remote to be disregarded in the absence 
of other evidence casting doubt on the defendant’s presence at the scene. The trial of 
 
32 As in, for example, R v Sampson and Kelly [2014] EWCA Crim 1968. 
33 R v Bracewell (1979) 68 Cr App R 4; R Gian and Mohd-Yussuf  [2009] EWCA Crim 2553. 
34 [2018] EWCA Crim 338 
35 Condron v UK (2001) 31 EHRR 1, [56]. 
36 R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1809. 
37  [2015] EWCA Crim 1732,  
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Stephen Lawrence’s murderers is a well-known instance where the possibilities of 
contamination were considered at length (Evans 2012).38   
In many trials the explanation of the scientific evidence is likely to be brief. One DNA 
expert interviewed by Salavacci (2014: 175) said that a general ‘explanation of the DNA 
process’ typically took ‘one or two minutes’, although this was not enough for jurors to 
understand the more difficult points about possibilities of transfer; another thought that 
while ‘huge amounts of technical detail’ were unnecessary, ‘a little lecture’ with visual aids 
could be helpful. Such a short presentation may suffice if the jury has a high level of trust 
in the scientist to summarise the state of the science correctly, and in the defence to 
challenge any statement that is controversial.  
The risk inherent in trusting such evidence is that the experts will ‘avoid the academic 
disclaimers’ and present only those aspects of current scientific thinking that favour the 
party calling them (Kaye 2010: 250). If the experts comply strictly with the Criminal 
Practice Direction they will state any necessary qualification to their evidence and explain 
where their opinion lies in relation to the range of opinion in their field;39 but it is unclear 
how these obligations are interpreted or enforced. For example if the ‘range of opinion in 
the field’ of forensic podiatry were limited to the opinions of forensic podiatrists,40 the 
‘extremely limited’ nature of the scientific evidence behind his ‘science’ – fortunately 
summarised in one of the two ‘primers’ on forensic science so far issued for use in the 
courts (Royal Society and Royal Society of Edinburgh 2017b:7) – might well be concealed.  
It would be highly desirable to ensure that in all Tsekiri-type cases there was independent 
evidence available to the court as well as the evidence of the Crown scientist. This could 
be from a court-appointed expert, as proposed by the Law Commission (2011), or a 
defence-instructed expert whose report the defence should be required to disclose.41 
Ideally, guilty pleas in such cases should not be accepted unless the defendant had been 
offered an independent evaluation of the scientific evidence.  
4. Reed-type cases – explanatory inferences by experts 
To borrow the useful terminology proposed by Carr et al (2018), the issue in Reed-type 
cases is one of ‘evaluative validity’, that is the validity of inferences from source-level to 
activity-level propositions. As Carr et al point out, the debate about the scientific validity 
of forensic techniques (e.g. PCAST 2016, Ward et al 2017) has focussed on their 
‘foundational validity’ – the ability of the method to give consistent and accurate results – 
and ‘validity as applied’, the appropriate application of the method to the case at hand; the 
crucial issue of evaluative validity has been largely neglected.  
Problems of evaluative validity arise in many kinds of expert evidence. They are pervasive 
in forensic pathology, where it is not usually questioned that medical experts can 
accurately record the lesions and symptoms to be found in a dead body, but inferences 
from these to the events that caused them may be much more problematic – and for 
 
38 The issue was also discussed at length by the Court of Appeal in deciding to order a new trial: R v Dobson 
[2011] EWCA Crim 1255, [2011] 1 WLR 3320. 
39 Crim PR 19.4 (f), (g); CPD 19A.5(8)  19B.1. 
40 As the Court of Appeal did in R v Otway [2011] EWCA Crim 3. 
41 Currently there is no such requirement in criminal cases (Stockdale 2018: 222). 
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obvious ethical reasons are difficult to test systematically (Wilson et al 2018). The ‘shaken 
baby’ cases42 are Reed-type cases: there was little doubt that doctors could reliability 
identify the symptoms known as the ‘triad’, but whether it could be inferred that the only 
plausible explanation of those symptoms was violent shaking was, and is, much more 
controversial (Lynøe et al 2017). Similar problems arise with psychiatric evidence, for 
example in diminished responsibility cases, except that here it is the clinical symptoms 
that are taken to explain the events, rather than the other way round.43  In forensic science 
generally, a pervasive problem is how the ‘reconstruction’ of events on the basis of trace 
evidence can be put on a scientific footing. (Morgan 2017). In the case of DNA evidence 
the problem is especially acute because of the gap between the ability to construct DNA 
profiles from infinitesimal amounts of cellular material and the much more limited base 
of scientific knowledge of how DNA is transferred and retained (Gill 2014, Murphy 2015). 
As Lynch et al (2008: 191) argue, ‘DNA evidence is meaningful only when it is embedded 
in stories that mention other evidence, possible suspects, and how the evidence itself was 
handled and interpreted’. This is true even in cases like Tsekiri, where the evidence is 
embedded in a story of how the robber grabbed the door handle of his victim’s car, how 
the DNA swab was collected and analysed, and why Tsekiri remained silent in interview 
and at court. In Reed-type cases, the surrounding story is more elaborate and can be 
challenged in a way that does not impugn the integrity or competence of the expert or 
others who have handled the evidence. Consequently the assessment of the evidence is 
less concerned with questions of trust, and more with holistic common-sense evaluation 
of different stories. The legal problems in these cases revolve around how far experts can 
contribute to the assessment of the overall story by drawing activity-level inferences from 
their source-level findings, and when such inferences improperly invade the province of 
the jury. 
In the case of Reed and Reed itself,44 the Reed brothers were implicated by a combination 
of DNA and circumstantial evidence in the murder of Peter Hoe. The forensic evidence 
was low copy number (LCN) profiling of traces of unidentified cellular material on two 
pieces of plastic which were alleged to be fragments of knife handles. Initially the 
appellants sought to challenge the validity of the LCN process, but this aspect of the appeal 
was abandoned. The only live issue about the DNA evidence concerned the admissibility 
of prosecution expert’s evaluation of the possibilities of transfer. The Court of Appeal held 
that most of this evidence was admissible, but the expert should not have expressed the 
opinion that the appellants were handling the knives when they broke. This was beyond 
her expertise and lacked any reliable scientific basis.45 While upholding the admissibility 
of evidence evaluating the possibility of transfer, the Court also stressed the need for strict 
control by the judge over the terms in which such evidence was to be given.46 
 
42 R v Harris [2005] EWCA Crim 1980, [2006] 1 Cr App R 5; R v Henderson [2010] EWCA Crim 1269, [2010] 
2 Cr App R 24. 
43 E.g. R v Golds [2016] UKSC 61, [2016] 1 WLR 5231. 
44 R v Reed and Reed, R v Garmson [2009] EWCA Crim 2698, [2010] 1 Cr App R 23. The Garmson appeal was, 
in our terminology, a ‘Dlugosz-type case’. 
45 Reed  
46 Ibid [122], [131], [133]. See also R v Henderson 
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In cases like Reed they jury’s decision does not depend simply on how far they trust, and 
therefore defer to, the experts. Rather, their task is to integrate the scientific evidence with 
evidence of other kinds. In Reed there was evidence of motive, opportunity, and what the 
prosecution interpreted as an attempt to conceal the involvement of one of the brothers; 
the defence adduced alibi evidence.47 In such a case the role of the expert is to help the 
jury to see how the scientific evidence can be integrated with other evidence, but not to 
perform the task of integration herself.  
In this respect, the Case Assessment and Interpretation approach (Cook et al 1998) is 
helpful. It encourages experts to focus on the question of how far the scientific evidence 
supports or undermines each of two competing hypotheses, but not to advance any view 
as to the prior or posterior probability of either hypothesis – i.e. how probable it is given 
the other evidence, or the other evidence and the scientific evidence combined. A fortiori, 
it is not the expert’s role to advance any view as to the coherence or plausibility of the 
narratives in which the opposing hypotheses are embedded. In this respect, the expert in 
Reed overstepped the mark in more ways than were noticed by the Court of Appeal. 
The leading authority for the principle that experts should not interpret evidence that jurors 
can interpret for themselves is Turner.48 If we define the three levels of the hierarchy of 
propositions in a way that is not limited to trace evidence, we can see that Turner itself was 
a Reed-type case. That is, it concerned the validity of an inference from the expert’s 
observation and classification of certain phenomena (Turner’s interview responses and 
other evidence of his psychological make-up) to a proposition about the events that we the 
subject of the trial (his murder – or manslaughter under provocation – of his unfaithful 
girlfriend). The defence psychiatrist inferred from his observations that Turner had a 
certain ‘personality structure’.49 The validity of this classification was not questioned by 
the Court of Appeal, though no doubt it could have been (Redmayne 2001: 147). The 
witness stated that this ‘structure’ was consistent with Turner’s account of having killed 
his fiancée ‘in an explosive release of blind rage’.50 While accepting that the psychiatrist’s 
evidence was relevant to this explanation, Lawton LJ pointed out that the evidence 
supporting the ‘blind rage’ theory came primarily from Turner’s own evidence, coupled 
with background knowledge of male reactions to female infidelity. The expert evidence 
was inadmissible because it would unduly complicate the jury’s task of assessing the 
plausibility of Turner’s evidence, and because it might be given undue weight on account 
of the psychiatrist’s expertise: 
In such a case if [expert opinion] is given dressed up in scientific jargon it may make 
judgment more difficult. The fact that an expert witness has impressive scientific 
qualifications does not by that fact alone make his opinion on matters of human 
nature and behaviour within the limits of normality any more helpful than that of 
the jurors themselves; but there is a danger that they may think it does.51 
 
47 Ibid (Reed) [13] 
48 [1975] QB 834. 
49 Ibid, 839. 
50 Turner, 839. 
51 Ibid, 841, emphasis added. 
13 
 
An additional reason, not explicitly stated, might have been that it would divert the jury 
from the ‘offence-level’ question of whether Turner’s reaction was that of a ‘reasonable 
man’ (Redmayne 2001: 149-54). The broad principle to be extracted from Turner is, I 
suggest, that relevant evidence adduced either by the prosecution or the defence may be 
excluded on the grounds of its tendency unduly to complicate the jury’s task, or to lead to 
undue deference on the jury’s part.  
While not referring directly to Turner, the Reed court was alert to the danger that the 
expert’s evidence would be ‘tainted with the verisimilitude of scientific certainty’.52 What 
it appeared to overlook was how the expert strayed into the jury’s province of making 
common-sense assessments of the plausibility of narratives – something that she appears 
to have been allowed to do because she was experienced in examining scenes of crime and 
had examined the scene of the murder.53 Thus she expressed the view that the ‘knives were 
foreign to the scene (as the handles did not match any in Peter Hoe’s kitchen)’;54 that it 
would ‘too much of a coincidence’ for each of the Reed brothers to have touched different 
knives which were then brought to Hoe’s house by a third person, or for Hoe to have 
touched the knives shortly after shaking hands with the defendants;55 and that for the DNA 
to have come from saliva ‘would have required the fortuity of saliva from two individuals 
landing on separate knife handles’.56 There is no indication that the scientist possessed 
expert knowledge about patterns of knife ownership which would justify her assumption 
that any knives in Hoe’s possession would have matching handles, nor is there any 
indication that she drew on any scientific research about the distribution of saliva.57 The 
points about the knives being ‘foreign’ and the hypotheses about secondary transfer resting 
on unlikely coincidences were therefore matters for the jury rather than the expert.  
The more appropriate course for an expert to take is illustrated by the agreed evidence in 
Bech,58 which simply stated that it was not possible scientifically to evaluate the likelihood 
of various mechanisms of transfer. This left the jury to draw ‘common sense’ inferences 
about whether the alternative hypotheses could be ruled out. Unfortunately both the trial 
judge and the Court of Appeal in Bech appear to have considered only whether alternative 
mechanisms of transfer by direct contact could be ruled out, and to have overlooked two 
other possibilities mentioned by the experts (saliva deposited while talking, and DNA 
being transferred to the airbag where it was found from the driver’s seat). (See Richmond 
2019.) 
Other aspects of the expert evidence in Reed, however, were matters of science on which 
the Court of Appeal considered that scientific knowledge was ‘plainly incomplete’.59 For 
example: 
 
52 Reed [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 [121]. 
53 Ibid, [81-2] 
54 Ibid, [87 (iv) 
55 Ibid, [89]. Hoe and one of the defendants were observed shaking hands some two weeks before the murder 
(Lightfoot 2013). 
56 Ibid, [90]. 
57 For one study that might have been relevant see Port et al (2006). As far as I can discover, consistency of 
design among a household’s stock of knives is a subject that has eluded scientific inquiry.   
58 [2018] EWCA Crim 448, [5]. 
59 Reed [119] 
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There would have had to have been ‘substantial contact’ between David and 
Terence Reed and those other persons and those other persons would have had to 
have been in contact with the knives ‘pretty quickly’ for the cellular material from 
David and Terence Reed to have got on to the knives. The profiles were so 
dominant that the cellular material could not have been on the knives for months. 
… [T]he fact that there were full profiles would tend to preclude the DNA having 
been there for any length of time as it would have degraded far more than it had, 
as some degradation is always to be expected where unidentified cellular material 
is deposited.60 
These are the kind of background generalizations that are needed in order to evaluate 
alternative explanatory stories. As the jurors cannot make such generalizations on the 
basis of their own experience or ‘common sense’, there is little alternative to relying on the 
experience of the experts.  trust the expert to give an honest and impartial interpretation 
of her experience rather than favouring generalizations that support her own explanatory 
theory.  
 the Court of Appeal  important that they should not be left with the impression that it 
carried the same degree of scientific authority as the interpretation of the DNA profile 
itself. For this reason, 
the court [must] exercise a firm degree of control over the admissibility of this type 
of evidence…. The evidence on the possibilities and the evaluation must be clearly 
set out in full in the terms in which it is to be given.61 
While Reed is one the cases, along with Dlugosz, that established a common-law basis for 
the ‘sufficiently reliable scientific basis’ test, it also makes clear that the test is not a very 
demanding one where evidence of transfer possibilities are concerned. It is sufficient that 
the evidence has some basis in properly conducted scientific research and the witness’s 
professional experience, and will be helpful to the jury in evaluating the prosecution case.  
At least in the present state of knowledge, this relatively relaxed standard of evaluative 
validity seems inevitable if DNA is to be used at all in cases where there is any dispute . 
Even with much more research, it is difficult to believe that it will ever be possible to 
evaluate the possibilities of transfer with any precision in a case like Reed. For example, 
suppose it is suggested that minute quantities of a suspect’s saliva were distributed around 
a room while he was speaking. There could be an almost infinite number of sub-hypotheses 
about where he was standing, his propensity to emit saliva while speaking, the position of 
the objects on which his DNA was later found, etc. The most that could be expected, even 
given more research, would be a vague indication of whether such a hypothesis was likely 
or unlikely. 
A relaxed standard of ‘sufficient reliability’ does not, however, seem too outrageous when 
all we are considering is background generalizations that can be used to assess the 
plausibility of competing stories. Juries must constantly apply such generalizations and 
rarely do they have any scientific basis. If the jury cannot rely on experience-based 
 
60 Ibid [89]. 
61 Ibid [122] 
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generalizations of their own, why can they not rely on generalizations formed by people 
who do have relevant experience (if they trust those people to represent their experience 
fairly)? In this context, the Court’s view that the scientist’s experience-based evidence was 
‘sufficiently reliable to be admitted’ but needed to be clearly distinguished from her 
scientific findings, makes sense. It is understandable that the Court preferred this solution 
to excluding the DNA evidence altogether, or leaving the jury to make of it what they 
could on the basis of ‘common sense’.  
5. Dlugosz-type cases: unvalidated but corroborated evidence 
R v Dlugosz62 is the authority cited in CPD 19A for the ‘sufficiently reliable scientific basis’ 
test being part of the common law. It was a conjoined hearing Court of Appeal of three 
appeals from different trials where alleles matching the defendant were found in a mixed, 
low-template DNA profile. In two cases the Crown expert gave evidence on the lines that 
although it was not possible to quantify the probability that the defendant was the 
contributor, the results were of a nature that the expert would expect to see if the defendant 
was a contributor and, on the basis of his or her experience, would consider unusual if the 
defendant had not contributed. In the third case, Pickering, where there had undoubtedly 
been some contact between the defendant and complainant, the evidence was that DNA 
which could have been Pickering’s was found in places which, if it was his DNA, were 
more consistent with the complainant’s story than his. 
Many of the best-known and most controversial cases in the law of expert evidence 
resemble Dlugosz in that expert evidence of weak or unknown probative value is adduced 
as one part of a body of evidence which taken together is arguably compelling.63 Typically 
in these cases the evidence identifies certain features of the source material: for example, 
certain alleles in a DNA trace which correspond to those of the defendant’s profile, or the 
shapes of certain parts of an image of a face.64 The available body of scientific knowledge 
does not, however, allow a precise statement of how many people are likely to share this 
combination of features. To fill this gap, the jury is invited to infer that because there is 
other evidence that the defendant acted in a way that could have caused the relevant trace 
evidence to exist, it is highly probable that the source of the trace evidence is the defendant. 
In other words, rather than the activity-level proposition being inferred from the source-
level proposition as in Reed, in a Dlugosz-type case the source-level and activity-level 
propositions are treated as mutually corroborative. 
Cases like this are analogous to Tsekiri-type cases in one way and to Reed-type cases in 
another. As in Tsekiri, the issues concern the foundational validity of the scientific evidence 
and whether it was validly applied to the case at hand. Since it is reasonable to expect that 
scientific evidence should meet rigorous standards of validity in these respects, this 
suggests that the kind of evidence adduced in Dlugosz should be regarded as no more than 
 
62 [2009] EWCA Crim 2698; [2010] 1 Cr App R 23 
63 E.g. R v Robb [1991] 93 Cr App R 161; R v Dallagher [2003] 1 Cr App R 12; R v Luttrell [2004] 2 Cr App R 
31 (see [38] for discussion of how other evidence can support or undermine the reliability of lip-reading 
evidence); R v Kai-Whitewind [2005] EWCA Crim 1092; R v Atkins [2009] EWCA Crim 1876, [2010] 1 Cr 
App R 8. 
64 It would make sense to call these sub-source level findings but for the fact that this term is used in a 
difference sense by forensic scientists, to refer for example to a DNA profile that cannot be assigned to a 
specific bodily fluid (e.g. Taroni et al 2013: 468; Gill 2014). 
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untested hypotheses, unfit to be admitted (Gill 2014). The analogy with Reed, on the other 
hand. is that the scientific evidence is one piece of a ‘jigsaw’65 which the jury can assess in 
a holistic fashion, considering whether the alleged actions of the defendant constitute the 
only reasonable explanation for the pattern of incriminating evidence. This suggests that 
the scientific basis of the evidence may be sufficiently reliable when considered in context, 
even if it would not pass the test in isolation. This argument seems particularly pertinent 
in the case of Kuba Dlugosz himself, who was convicted of the manslaughter of an elderly 
householder who had been tied up during a burglary. Dlugosz was initially identified as a 
suspect through a database search.66 As Gill (2014: loc 3269) points out, this would be a 
dangerous basis for a prosecution if it were the sole or main evidence against a suspect, 
i.e. in anything approaching a Tsekiri-type case. The facts of Dlugosz, however, were 
significantly different from those of Tsekiri. Dlugosz had committed previous burglaries in 
which the occupier of the premises was tied up, and also made incriminating remarks in 
telephone calls from prison which were recorded by the authorities.  In these circumstances 
it seems reasonable to treat the DNA evidence as analogous to an eyewitness identification 
made in poor conditions – not to be relied upon if it stood alone, but of significant 
probative value in the context of the other evidence. 
The difficulty with this argument is how weak the non-scientific evidence can be before a 
Dlugosz-type case becomes a Tsekiri-type case, where the DNA evidence is so decisive that 
anything short of rigorously demonstrated scientific validity would be unacceptable. There 
are indications in the Dlugosz judgment that the Court of Appeal saw the case as quite close 
to the borderline. Without the DNA evidence, the character evidence could not have been 
admitted.67 The defence argued that as the DNA evidence was weak, the character 
evidence was being used to ‘bolster a weak case’ and therefore ought to have been excluded 
following the guidance in Hanson.68 The Court of Appeal concluded that taking the DNA 
evidence and the recorded telephone evidence together, there was sufficient evidence to 
justify admitting the previous convictions.69 This suggests that had Dlugosz not been so 
indiscreet in talking on a prison telephone, the case against him might have collapsed. 
Dlugosz appears, then, to be consistent with a fairly cautious approach to cases of this type, 
at least where the non-scientific evidence largely relates to bad character. That there is 
good reason to be cautious is indicated by the research that Gill and colleagues carried out 
to check the assumptions made in Dlugosz. They showed that with a low-template, mixed 
sample of the type analysed in Dlugosz, it is quite likely that a random person in the 
database will match 20 alleles, while the true contributor, even if on the database, may 
match fewer alleles as result of allele ‘drop-out’ (Gill 2014: loc 3287-3309). People on the 
database will tend to have previous convictions, and it would not be surprising if some of 
those showed a propensity for, say, burglary. The danger, as Gill (2014: loc 3629) remarks, 
is that ‘confirmation bias’ will lead a ‘naïve investigator’ to select the person found on the 
database for prosecution without looking for exculpatory evidence. 
 
65 Bracewell J’s oft-quoted metaphor in Re A (a minor) (Retinal Haemorrhages: Non-accidental injury) [2001] 3 
FCR 262, [10]. 
66 Dlugosz [2009] EWCA Crim 2698 [35] 
67 Dlugosz [39] 
68 Hanson [2005] 2 Cr App R 21, cited in Dlugosz, [56]. 
69 Ibid (Dlugosz) [60]. 
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There is another reason for caution in admitting the type of evidence given in Dlugosz. For 
the jury to accept the scientist’s interpretation they have to trust her to draw honest and 
objective conclusions from her experience, and there is reason to think that the evidence 
in Dlugosz itself was subtly (and we may presume, unconsciously) biased towards the 
prosecution in at least two respects. One concerned the scientist’s evidence that ‘she had 
not seen all 20 of the components of an individual’s profile represented in a mixed profile 
when it was believed that the individual had no association with the item from which the 
profile was obtained’70 – which prompts the question ‘believed by whom?’ If it means 
‘believed by the police’ there is an obvious risk of their too readily believing that those who 
match the profile are associated with the offence.71 The second objection is pointed out in 
the Forensic Science Regulator’s Guidance (2018). To put the point simply, it is that while 
the probability of matching all 20 alleles to a random person may be , so is the probability 
of finding all 20 alleles of the perpetrator in a very small mixed profile. To point out only 
the rarity of the former is therefore prejudicial (ibid para 4.2.2). On this ground the 
Regulator recommends that the type of evidence accepted in Dlugosz, Thomas72 and Walsh73 
should no longer be given (ibid para 7.2.2, Guideline 12).f in a future case the prosecution 
were to rely on the same kind of evidence that was admitted in Dlugosz, the judge should 
pay heed not just to the result of Dlugosz but to paragraph 27 of the judgement, which states 
that where there is a ‘danger…that a jury might attach a false or misleading significance 
to the evidence’, the evidence, even if it has a sufficiently reliable scientific basis to be 
admitted, should be excluded under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 78. In 
light of the Regulator’s guidance it is clear that the way the evidence was expressed in 
Dlugosz created just such a danger; but if the court follows the guidance in Reed to scrutinize 
and control the terms in which the evidence is to be given, recourse to s 78 can probably 
be avoided. Although s 78 applies only to prosecution evidence, it is clear from Turner that 
defence evidence which risks confusing or misleading the jury can be excluded at common 
law. 
Potential reliability and the exclusionary ethos cannot be expected, unaided, to notice 
the particular ways in which the expert’s necessarily simplified account of the science (e.g. 
counting the number of alleles) unduly favours one party. For this they are dependent on 
forms of ‘quality control’ (Kaye 2010: 259) such as that provided by the Regulator. This 
reflects a general feature of the ‘epistemic division of labour’ in a complex society 
(Goldberg 2011). Non-experts depend upon expert individuals and bodies of various kinds 
to monitor the testimony of other experts and weed out or warn against the testimony of 
(purported) experts who are unreliable. This means that non-experts do not have to place 
blind trust in individual experts: rather, their trust is placed in a complex system by which 
experts monitor one another. If this system is dysfunctional – if, for example, scientific 
views are monitored for ideological purity rather than scientific rigour – the results can be 
disastrous.74 Something of this dysfunctionality can be seen in some US states’ regulation 
of forensic science (Murphy 2015: 57-73). 
 
70 Ibid [21(iii)] 
71 For a similar point see Gill (2014: loc 3210). 
72 [2011] EWCA Crim 1295. 
73 [2011] NICC 32. 
74 The classic example is Lysenkoism in Soviet biology and agriculture (Gordin 2012, Ch 3). 
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What this means in practical terms is that judges and lawyers need to keep abreast, not 
necessarily of any body of scientific literature, but of the work of key epistemic ‘monitors’ 
such as the National Academies of Science in the US and the Forensic Science Regulator 
in the UK – and, if possible, to be informed of any cogent criticisms of those bodies’ work. 
So, for example, Conclusion 
The combined effect of the common law test – i.e. Turner with the explicit focus on 
reliability added by Dlugosz and Reed – along with s 78 and the Crim PD is, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, not unlike that of the statutory test originally proposed by the Law 
Commission. A key feature of the Law Commission proposal was it took into account 
both the scientific basis and the ‘strength’ of the expert’s opinion – how strongly it was 
expressed and how strongly it would have to be expressed in order to be capable of affecting 
the verdict, given the other evidence in the case.  
This kind of contextualized approach to the admissibility of expert evidence, which 
parallels the ‘potentially safely reliable test’ for hearsay evidence, is in my view preferable 
to either a ‘laissez faire’ approach or a hard-line ‘exclusionary ethos’. The dangers of the 
‘laissez-faire’ approach can be summed up as the ‘lure of the obvious explanation’ and the 
‘temptation of blind trust’. In cases like Bech and Reed there is an explanation for DNA 
trace evidence that neatly fits the prosecution’s theory of the case – but is there a rational 
basis on which the jury can be sure that it is the only plausible explanation? The temptation 
to trust the expert excessively – that is to a degree that spares the prosecution the need to 
prove an essential element of its case – arises from the reason we generally trust experts:  
to make our cognitive lives easier and our decisions less time-consuming (Mieg 2001). If 
we hand crucial decisions over to unpaid, unqualified conscripts, the temptation for them 
to pass the buck to the experts is potentially strong. It is perhaps surprising that juries 
emerge from the limited empirical work available with as much credit as they do 
(Freckelton et al 2016, Ch 5). 
In an explanationist approach to expert evidence, the probative value of the evidence 
depends both on the best explanation of how the evidence came to be given (as a result of 
competent application of a properly validated technique, or by some more questionable 
route) and what the expert evidence contributes to an explanatory theory of the case as a 
whole. In the case of prosecution evidence, and especially where expert evidence is the 
mainstay of the prosecution, the experts must do all that is reasonably practicable to rule 
out possibilities such as contamination and the misleading presentation of results. The 
possibility of fraudulent, incompetent or misleading evidence cannot be completely 
eliminated, so to a certain extent expert evidence has to be taken on trust – a trust which 
is easier to justify where it is backed up by effective regulatory oversight. Trust must, 
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